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Holiness Thought and the 
Moral Image of Man 
EDWARD H. MADDEN 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century Christianity was at its 
lowest ebb in the history of the American settlements. Moral 
repugnance against Old School Calvinism had in large part made 
deistic views of the Enlightenment an acceptable alternative to our 
founding fathers. To the mass of people, however, the natural 
theology of the Enlightenment soon proved to be as unpalatable as 
Calvinism. So it was that, at the turn of the century, a new brand 
of evangelical, freewill Trinitarian ism began to flourish and attract 
converts by droves. Barton Stone, Alexander Campbell, Asa Shinn, 
John Rankin, and Asa Mahan were active ministers on the 
frontier- -that is, Kentucky, Ohio and what is now West Virginia--
while Lyman Beecher preached the New Light doctrine in 
Connecticut and Charles Grandison Finney preached through upper 
New York State and produced, among others, the great Rochester 
revival. I 
The freewill Trinitarians, entirely interdenominational, were 
completely dependent on Thomas Reid and the Scottish realist 
tradition for their rebuttals of Calvinistic determinism and for their 
agent causality interpretation of free will (which meant that man is 
the cause of his own acts and nothing causes him to act the way he 
does, for motives are not causes). The Americans were mainly 
influenced by Reid and Dugald Stewart and, shortly after, by 
Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy, French advocates of much 
of Reid's thought. We will examine in some detail the Trinitarians' 
critique of Calvinism and their own concept of agent causality 
since they constitute the crucial elements of the Reidian moral 
image of man and hence of the freewill Trinitarians who grounded 
their views in the Scottish tradition.2 Before beginning my detailed 
examination I need to point out that the Holiness Movement is a 
sub-class of freewill Trinitarianism. Holiness advocates, to be sure, 
held the Reidian view of agency, like any other members of the 
freewill Trinitarian tradition; but not all of the latter, of course, 
held the holiness view of sanctification. So it follows that 
everything I say about agency will be true of the whole class. 
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Those aspects of the moral image of man unique to holiness 
thought we will examine a bit later. 
I 
Asa Mahan, first president of Oberlin College and deep in the 
holiness tradition, ardently criticized Old School views; they make 
moral responsibility impossible and turn God into an unjust tyrant. 
If men have no power whatever to choose or act differently than in 
fact they do, then the concepts of merit and demerit, and the 
consequent propriety of reward and punishment, become 
meaningless and inapplicable . And God is transformed into a 
tyrant when he admonishes men to give up their sinful ways since 
He is demanding of them the impossible. God must be seen on 
Judgment Day as eternally damning certain souls and saving others 
when none of the lot supposedly could have done other than they 
did, and so merit no judgment at all.3 Dr. Emmons' Old School 
view is the oddest of all since he was an occasionalist and believed 
that all things considered to have been done by human beings were 
in fact done by the direct agency of God. Hence God is conceived 
as punishing men for His divinely instituted acts. Do not all of 
these strange consequences constitute a reductio ad absurdum of old 
School Calvinism? Mahan answered "yes" unequivocally; but he 
still needed to show that later Edwardsian efforts to make 
determinism compatible with freedom and moral responsibility--
what has come to be called "soft" determinism in contrast to the 
" hard" determinism of the Old School--were unsatisfactory and 
failed to do the job. 
According to Jonathan Edwards, freedom means the power or 
ability to do as one pleases. One is unfree only if he is compelled 
to do other than he wishes. A man is not responsible for what he 
is compelled to do, but he is responsible for what he does when he 
is not coerced. After all , in such cases he is the one who does as 
he pleases and so is responsible. Mahan objected that this 
argument confuses several senses of the word freedom, a confusion 
made evident by comparing "freedom" with the concepts of 
servitude and determinism. Freedom contrasted with servitude 
means that a man can do as he pleases because he is not in chains 
or forced by other constraints to do other than he would . Freedom 
contrasted with determinism means that a man can please (or will) 
to do one thing rather than another; he is under no constraint to 
will or choose the way he in fact does. Freedom in the second 
sense is what is required for the ascription of responsibility. 
Edwards allowed only freedom in the first sense and offered it, 
irrelevantly, as sufficient grounds for ascribing responsibil ity. 
Mahan summed up the point succinctly: determinism is identical 
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with Fatalism "in its worst form"; they both alike affirm that man 
can "do as he pleases" and both agree that "man cannot but please 
to do as he does." 4 
It might be supposed that the defense of free will, as in Mahan's 
case, would invariably be directed against the Calvinists, and there 
is much truth in such a supposition. However, some medics, 
physiologists and chemists occasionally used their scientific 
determinism against religion, and such scientists as well as the 
Calvinists had to be dealt with by the New Lights. The defense of 
free will against scientific determinism fell to the lot of Alexander 
Campbell in his great debate with Robert Owen.5 
Owen failed to see, Campbell averred, that the concept of cause 
is not applicable to human actions. To act as an agent "is quite 
different from the running of water, the blowing of the wind, or 
the revolution of a mill wheel." A cause necessarily produces its 
effect while motives do not, for it is "up to the person" to decide 
in any given case what motive, among many possible ones, will be 
chosen and will explain why he acted the way he did . It is in this 
sense that a person initiates an act, does something that makes the 
future in part different from what it otherwise would be, and 
prevents him from being simply a link in an infinite causal chain. 
Frequently rational motives win out, though that need not be the 
case. Choosing freely, Campbell wrote, "is sometimes to go with 
our feelings, and sometimes against them."6 But, whatever is 
chosen, the fact remains that a person is able without any change 
of character to choose and act differently at different times even 
though the conditions, except for time, are identical. 
Determinists objected that Campbell's view leads to 
indeterminism and chaos. There would be no reliability in human 
action if a person could act differently in two identical situations 
and without a change in character to make the different responses 
understandable. Campbell was unimpressed by the change-in-
character doctrine, part and parcel, as he saw it, of the whole 
determinist misconception that motives are causes. What specific 
counter-examples did Campbell have in mind? Something like the 
following ones are implied by what he said in more general terms. 
Man is not omniscient; he can misjudge the nature of an act one 
time and judge correctly another. Or he might act perversely 
toward moral rules, or even against his own legitimate interests, the 
second time, say, just to prove, as Dostoievski would have it, that 
he is not a set of piano keys to be played upon by external forces . 
Or a person might intentionally allow a selfish motive to rule in 
one case since sainthood is not demanded of him. He was helpful 
to the needy last time; this time he passes by the needy and 
indulges himself. Some people, to be sure, simply refuse to act in 
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any consistent manner, choosing willy-nilly at the whim of the 
moment. Other people, it must be emphasized, act perfectly 
consistently and predictably according to principles which they 
have chosen to guide their lives.7 
Campbell would claim that none of these cases leads to 
indeterminism or chaos but that they are perfectly understandable 
in the agent causality framework and do not require invoking a 
change in the agent's nature, the last resort in the determinist's 
decline. 
That the concept of cause is not applicable to human actions is 
the theme of the whole Scottish tradition . A few writers in the 
tradition, notably Dr. Gregory, tried to formalize the difference 
between the cause-effect and motive-action relations, one of the 
most successful being the conceptual-connection argument, still 
promulgated in the twentieth century by such able philosophers as 
A. I. Melden and several of Roderick Chisholm's students.8 
According to this argument, a cause and effect can be described 
independently of each other, while a motive and an act cannot be 
independently described since they are conceptually connected. 
Motives provide the point of an action, and the action is to be 
understood by this point--hence the two are conceptually or 
intentionally related. Not many figures in the early tradition 
accepted this formal differentia, whatever its merits may be, since 
it seems to depend upon a Humean view of causality but mainly 
because Dugald Stewart thought such criteria unnecessary. There 
is, he thought, a more direct way of making the distinction, which 
involves knowledge of the Scot's metaphilosophy. 
According to Asa Shinn, articulating the work of Reid , the mind 
of man is not a tabula rasa but has nativistic epistemic import into 
knowledge claims.9 The concept of space, for example, cannot be 
learned from experience inasmuch as it is a prerequisite for all 
perceptual knowing and hence must be nativistically basic. The 
same is true for agency theory. A person is directly aware of 
acting freely and responsibly. This claim is universal and catholic, 
and these criteria suggest that this awareness is basic and part of 
the epistemic input of the intellect itself. Moreover, such a belief 
is unavoidable in the sense that while one may reject it in his 
philosophical study he immediately reverts to it in the market 
place. That Hume and other skeptics admitted this fact speaks 
highly of their honesty but not their consistency. Now, if a belief 
is unavoidable it is necessary, but necessities cannot be learned 
from experience. Hence the belief is part of the original epistemic 
input of the intellect itself. Kant later called such original 
epistemic input the transcendental esthetic and the categories of the 
understanding . Reid, however, being a natural realist, avoided 
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Kant's distinction between phenomenal and noumenal and hence 
avoided Kant's skepticism in advance. 
It must not be supposed that the advocates of agent causality 
thought man is always an agent, an initiator of events; far from it. 
They believed that some human behavior, as distinct from an act, 
is caused by events over which a person has no control. Thomas 
Upham, professor of philosophy at Bowdoin College, and a stalwart 
in the holiness tradition, stressed this point. 10 He was the most 
psychologically sophisticated member of the Reidian tradition. 
According to Upham, the McNaghten rule of insanity is pernicious. 
On this rule, a person is insane if he does not know the difference 
between right and wrong and cannot reason in the sense of relating 
means to ends. Upham saw that such a rule was a disaster. He 
was close to the mark when he insisted that a person can reason in 
a perfectly acceptable way, adapting means to ends, but that this 
ability is pointless when it proceeds from crazy premises. Such a 
person is not responsible and yet, according to the McNaghten Act, 
he can be condemned to death. Moreover, the ascription of 
insanity and commitment to an asylum is such a serious matter that 
it must never be undertaken lightly, particularly since morally 
depraved individuals have endeavored to fasten the charge of 
insanity upon others in order to control them and their money. 
Finally, Upham said, compassion toward people with mental 
problems is essential. It is clearly the moral duty of society to see 
that those who are legitimately committed are treated humanely. 
Let us now sum up the moral image of man that emerges from 
our discussion. An agent is dynamic and active, is not simply 
acted upon, but initiates actions, is not epiphenomena! but makes a 
crucial difference in the world . The agent is not a link in an 
infinite causal chain but makes a genuine difference in what the 
future will hold. He produces something new and original in the 
universe by virtue of his free will. Agency is defined volitionally 
and existentially; it is "up to a person" to decide what he will do 
and what sort of person he will become. While one has motives 
which suggest opposite kinds of acts, one must choose among them; 
one must decide what will give meaning, whether good or bad, to 
what one does or to the life one adopts. An agent is spontaneous, 
and may even act perversely just to prove that he is not a piano 
key to be played upon. An agent does not act rigidly; but may act 
differently under identical conditions without chaos or the need of 
introducing the change-of-character theme. His mind is not a 
tabula rasa but is itself active and provides, along with releasing 
occasions, its own explanation of his basic experience of freed om. 
Finally, the agent is, or should be, compassionate, guarding the 
unfortunately impaired ones to see that they are treated humanely. 
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II 
Having restored freedom to their satisfaction, the freewill 
Trinitarians relied again on Reid and Stewart--and Butler, too--to 
formulate a moral philosophy, something the Old School Calvinists 
could not do given their "hard determinism." The moral image of 
man conceived by the Holiness Movement is identical with that of 
the whole freewill Trinitarian tradition. As we shall see, they all 
agreed in condemning classical utilitarianism, as well as the 
Edwards-Finney variant of this doctrine . They generally espoused 
instead a fitting-relationship and voluntaristic view of moral 
philosophy. We must wait a bit longer before we d iscuss those 
elements of the moral image of man unique to the holiness 
tradition. 
Francis Wayland, president of Brown University, was perhaps 
the most relentless critic of classical utilitarianism. What follows is 
only a small sample of his arguments, but even these cannot be 
evaluated in our time span. 11 
1. Children are perfectly aware of the differences between 
right and wrong without being capable of comprehending, let 
alone calculating, the greatest amount of happiness for all 
people affected by an act. 
2. We are frequently ignorant of what will happen in the 
future; hence any moral judgment based on the consideration 
of likely consequences is doomed to fail. 
3. Every act has infinite consequences. Where, short of 
infinity, can the utilitarian draw the line and make his 
judgment? 
4 . Crimes sometimes have the happiest results-- indeed, 
given the utilitarian view, "we must award to the treachery 
of Judas the praise of the greatest virtue." 12 
5. The utilitarian is unable to distinguish between specific 
virtues; they are all taken up into the single virtue recognized 
by utilitarians. Most duties depend upon fitting relations 
among human beings . Gratitude and benefactor fit together, 
and yet all fitting relationships are wiped out by the 
utilitarian. 
While evangelist C. G . Finney was an ardent critic of Calvinism, 
he nevertheless, surprisingly, held a moral theory precisely like that 
of Jonathan Edwards.13 He was one of the very few New Lights to 
accept Reid's agency theory but abandoned the moral theories of 
the Scottish tradition. As we shall see , Finney wanted his view to 
be distingu ished carefully from all forms of utilitarianism, though 
it seemed to some of his peers that this was prec isely what it 
amounted to. 
Finney distinguished between a right intention and a derivative 
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right act. He called the latter an "outward act" and said the only 
reason for doing it is that one intends to promote universal well-
being and this act will probably do so. He also called the intention 
of the agent an act--it is the choice or decision to want to promote 
universal well-being, and the only reason that justifies this choice 
is the intrinsic goodness of the end envisioned. This "ultimate act" 
must not itself be justified by any reference to utility. For Finney 
that is precisely what utilitarians do--they fallaciously try to 
justify the ultimate act. The worst "justification," he thought, was 
Paley's wholly egoistic one to the effect that one should choose to 
help others in the expectation of reward in the afterlife for doing 
so! 
It is certainly understandable that Finney did not want his view 
associated with Paley's. However, those commentators on his moral 
philosophy who called it a form of utilitarianism had no intention 
of identifying it with Paley's system. The critics realized that 
Finney's views were not identical with any other view (with the 
exception of Edwards's) but argued that in the long run all 
utilitarian or teleological systems have a common core of meaning. 
They all insist that only one thing is intrinsically valuable--be it 
pleasure, happiness, or well-being for me, you, or everyone, 
including God--and that all other acts and events in the world are 
valuable only insofar as they are conducive to achieving this end. 
Finney's most intimate critic--his colleague Asa Mahan--focused 
on what he took to be the essential point, namely, that there are 
many basic obligations of life which cannot be reduced to one all-
inclusive principle. Obligations, duties and rights depend upon 
perceiving certain "fitting relationships" in the web of social life. 
Even Finney realizes, Mahan wrote, that there is a fitting 
relationship between virtue and happiness. After all, who could 
deny that Finney believes in the Final Judgment? Thus he must 
believe that only virtuous people deserve to be happy. But then 
Finney's single principle of right and wrong is already lost. 14 He 
has at least one non-teleological sense of moral duty which is 
incompatible with his general utilitarian views. 
Tappan and Mahan claimed that no justification of moral rules 
is possible--whether utilitarian, Kantian or any other--since they 
all involve giving a non-moral reason for doing one's duty. We do 
not give reasons why acting fairly is right; we simply see that it is 
a fitting relation among all people, or, again, that it is part of a 
web of social responses that constitutes a shared life, which may be 
freely accepted and experienced. Just so, a person is free to reject 
that way of living and, as contemporary advertisements have 
stressed, "Dare to take it all." Tappan's and Mahan's views, we 
might say, borrowing from contemporary usage, are existential. 
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For the import of this word seems to fit precisely the freewill 
claim that volition defines man, not reason or sensuousness. It 
must be kept in mind, of course, that the freewill Trinitarians 
insisted that the reasonable life is the moral life and they highly 
regarded its control over sensuous motives. However, reason was 
not coercive for them as it was for the post-Kantians. A man may 
choose to adopt a reasonable motive, to accept the fitting 
relationships, or choose a sensuous one to guide his actions; but in 
either case he is responsible for his choice. He is responsible for 
the kind of person he is to become.1.5 
Let us see how the freewill Trinitarians fared on some basic 
moral issue--and what issue could be more basic than the crime of 
slavery? We will consider in this context Campbell , Mahan, 
Wayland, Finney, Fairchild and John Rankin. We will see how the 
Reidian and utilitarian responses to the issue contrast. 
Campbell's case is the saddest. He began as a Reidian in moral 
philosophy and was actively anti-slavery in his earlier years. Then 
the abolitionists came along--Weld, Garrison, Rankin, Mahan and 
Luther Lee--and said that slavery was a sin, that sin cannot be 
eliminated gradually, and that slavery, therefore, must be done 
away with at once. Campbell agreed that if slavery were a sin then 
immediate emancipation was necessary. But he then reasoned on 
utilitarian grounds that emancipation was fraught with evil , would 
disrupt the economy of the nation, and perhaps lead to civil war. 
Hence he felt he must deny the premise and say that slavery was 
not a sin. But on what grounds to sustain this denial? Campbell 
decided to drop all philosophical morality and to put in its place a 
biblical criterion of morality according to which slavery was not a 
sin since the Bible condones it in several places and nowhere 
rejects it explicitly as sinful. 16 One might have objected to 
Campbell's claim and said that slavery seems out of harmony with 
the whole spirit of the New Testament. Mahan, however, would 
have none of these piecemeal responses. He considered all attempts 
at biblical justifications of slavery as so much chaff in the wind. 
He clearly did not believe that the Bible in any way condones 
slavery. Mahan went to the heart of the matter when he said that 
if one could clearly prove that the Bible condoned slavery he would 
not have shown that slavery is right but that the Bible is wrong. 17 
Wayland, sharing Mahan's moral philosophy, went at a slower 
pace. He was anti-slavery always; but due to the violence of the 
Dorr Rebellion--which concerned the issue of whether people 
without property should have voting rights--he became frightened 
of the abolitionists. However, his disgust with the Mexican War, 
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, bleeding Kansas and numerous 
other events, finally convinced him that slavery had to be done 
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away with at whatever cost. For a while he supported the 
abolitionists only by "speaking the truth as he saw it" and 
becoming active in the Free Soil and Republican parties. 
Eventually, however, he fed, housed and clothed a runaway slave 
and sent him safely to freedom. In 1859 he could not even bring 
himself to condemn John Brown; he admired the "bravery, 
coolness, and evident sincerity of the old captain." 18 
Finney was clearly anti-slavery, preaching, as he did, against 
slavery and occasionally taking active measures against it. Though 
he was not necessarily opposed to his abolitionist colleagues, he was 
by no means their leader. Through the years fewer Oberlin 
students became professional abolitionist lecturers, many having 
been dissuaded from the task by Finney, who wanted to push 
revivalism and regeneration of the soul instead. James H. 
Fairchild, third president of Oberlin and devoted follower of 
Finney, was extremely conservative and during his presidency led 
Oberlin out of the Holiness Movement. He was also orthodox in 
political matters; e.g., he fought against women's suffrage to the 
end. 
Mahan, ardent abolitionist, was quite different from his cautious 
colleagues. When Mahan was appointed president of Oberlin in 
1835, the tradition started of flouting all fugitive slave laws, 
whether state or federal. Oberlin was an extremely important part 
of the underground railroad. Through the years many hundreds of 
slaves found shelter in Oberlin, some staying indefinitely and 
others pursuing the journey to Canada. Most of the Oberlin 
community cooperated with this type of civil disobedience. 
President Mahan's house was one of those in which runaway slaves 
were regularly hidden. Mahan is reported to have said that should 
the authorities attempt to capture the fugitives he and other 
members of the community would fight until the last. While this 
report came from Delazon Smith, an unreliable source, there is 
nevertheless probably a small kernel of truth in it. 19 
John Rankin, one of the greatest abolitionists, founded an anti-
slavery society in Kentucky at the astoundingly early date of 1818. 
As late as 1832 the Lane Seminary students in Cincinnati were 
prohibited from having an abolitionist society. Rankin served two 
pastorates in Carlisle, Kentucky, and subsequently moved to 
Ripley, Ohio, not far from Cincinnati, where Rankin was well 
known to Weld, Mahan and Lyman Beecher. Rankin did more 
than preach and lecture against slavery. He was not content with 
only trying to regenerate people's souls so that slavery would 
eventually disappear; far from it. Rankin was active in the 
Underground Railroad and was perfectly located at Ripley to 
receive runaway slaves on their flight to freedom. According to 
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the National Cyclopedia, "He it was who assisted the colored 
woman and her child, the originals of Eliza and her boy in Uncle 
Tom's Cabin, to escape from slavery." 20 There is a John Rankin 
House State Memorial in Ripley, a fine tribute to the real pioneer 
among abolitionists. 
Intransigence, boldness and volitional autonomy constitute the 
moral image of man arising from the specific moral commitments 
of the freewill Trinitarians. The agent absolutely rejects happiness 
as the sum mum bonum and commits himself, uncoerced, to the 
web of fitting relationship that constitutes a shared existence. He 
emphasizes the fitting relationship between what a person does and 
his just desserts. We must do our duty even if the consequences 
are extremely painful. And so Mahan, John Copeland, Calvin 
Fairbanks, Henry Cowles and Luther Lee, among others in the 
holiness tradition, boldly opted for abolitionism. Many others in 
the tradition worked actively in anti-slavery circles even though 
they were not abolitionists. The agent never tries to prove that he 
should act morally. To try to do so is to step out of the moral 
realm. However, the agent remains volitionally autonomous. It is 
"up to him" whether to step into the web or to stay out of it. The 
agent must decide between conflicting motives; he must decide 
what kind of person to become. There are no acts without 
motives, to be sure, but motives are not causes. The agent must 
decide, sometimes early on, whether to act morally or "dare to take 
it all." 
III 
The holiness tradition is extremely complex and does not lend 
itself to anything like an adequate analysis in a few pages . The 
complexity is suggested by the variety of names used to describe 
the tradition: for example, scriptural holiness, Christian perfection , 
the second blessing, sanctification, the higher life, perfect love, full 
consecration, the baptism of the Holy Ghost, the rest of faith , and 
the enduement of power.21 
While some of these expressions have been interpreted in 
different ways, they have, nevertheless, a common Pentecostal 
element since they stress the weakness and frailty of human agents 
and their need for the indwelling Spirit to reach higher spiritual 
levels. Through the grace of God, the indwelling Spirit is available 
through deeply earnest and sincere prayers. The results of this 
Presence are manifold: victory over sin, consolation in affliction, 
sustainment of heavy burdens, transcendental joy in the presence 
of God , and an enduement of power to work effectively for Him--
to preach beyond one's own natural powers and thereby to be 
wondrously successful in revivals and conversions in general. 
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Scriptural holiness, Christian perfection, the second blessing, 
sanctification, perfect love and full consecration generally ref erred 
to victory over sin; baptism of the Holy Ghost and the "rest of 
faith" to consolation and sustainment; and "the baptism" and the 
enduement of power to doing God's work beyond one's natural 
abilities. The latter two expressions are the most strictly 
Pentecostal ref erring, as they do, to the descent of the Holy Spirit 
upon the apostles.22 
Let us pursue in some detail the sanctification, scriptural 
perfection and full consecration strand in the Holiness Movement. 
According to these doctrines, in order to achieve victory over sin, 
the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit must be sincerely prayed 
for; and the grace of God brings about the indwelling Presence. 
With the indwelling Spirit one becomes wholly sanctified and is 
capable of a perfect commitment to follow God's commandments. 
It must not be supposed, however, that a sanctified or fully 
consecrated person necessarily acts perfectly. We must distinguish 
between a sanctified will , which characterizes an agent, and 
objective rightness or wrongness, which characterize an act. A 
person is holy or perfect only if he is wholly committed to God's 
commandments; an act is perfect if, in addition to the agent's 
sanctified intention, the act itself is just, right or appropriate. 
That a sanctified will seems attainable is not unlikely, since it 
would be odd for a Christian knowingly to consecrate himself to 
God only partially. But no person is able to act perfectly since no 
one except God is infinitely wise. Given one's imperfect 
knowledge, a person is bound to produce out of ignorance acts that 
are strangely wrong or unjust even though one's will is genuinely 
sanctified. However, unjust acts resulting from ignorance are sins, 
and the person's will not sanctified if the requisite knowledge is 
available. 
The distinction between the instantaneous sanctification of the 
will and the growth in holiness through increased knowledge of the 
will of God and to increased sensitivity to the casuistic dimensions 
of morality is an important distinction and helps to clarify a 
specific point of John Wesley's teaching. Sometimes he wrote as if 
sanctification were instantaneous while at other times he seemed to 
think of it as a gradual process.23 It is not unlikely that Wesley's 
problem resulted from not first distinguishing between the 
sanctification of the will and the increase in holiness through 
increasing knowledge. Sanctification of the will can then be 
characterized as instantaneous and holiness as gradual, growing as 
the knowledge of God's will, through the guidance of the Spirit, 
becomes increasingly evident. 
Calvinists asked if an allegedly sanctified individual would never 
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be subject to temptation, which is itself a sin. In response, holiness 
advocates pointed out that on this reasoning Christ himself would 
count as a sinner since He was tempted--certainly a reductio ad 
absurdum of the Calvinist thrust. "The fact that Christ was thus 
tempted, and yet without sin, absolutely implies that mere 
temptation to sin is not sin in anyone." Only temptation yielded to 
is sin. "Temptation promptly resisted and overcome implies the 
purest and brightest virtues known in the universe of God. "24 
The advocates of holiness, perfection and sanctification had 
constantly to fend off the criticism that the movement was 
antinomian in import. The critics thought that the inward presence 
of the Holy Ghost amounts simply to the supplanting of human 
agency by divine agency; and hence whatever a person does, since 
the Spirit of Christ is operative, is right no matter if it contravenes 
what we ordinarily mean by morality. How is the holiness 
tradition, they asked, different from Humphrey Noyes's antinomian 
perfectionism which justified, on the grounds of the inward spirit, 
such reprehensible practices as "complex marriages." And we can 
only say that his followers who criticized Noyes did not see the 
heart of the moral issue when they complained that their leader 
usually got the most appealing complexes. 
The Holiness Movement replied that antinomianism, the 
displacement of human agency, is completely inapplicable to the 
concept of sanctification since it denies what the movement insists 
upon, agent causality, a strong formulation of the freewill doctrine . 
Man is weak, to be sure, but free agency is involved in all holiness 
transactions. A person sincerely prays, wholly uncoerced, for a 
new nature capable of complete dedication to God's 
commandments. The indwelling Spirit replaces a heart of stone 
with a heart of flesh, and the agent has a new character for which 
he freely asks: and, moreover, he is not coerced to keep this nature. 
Again, keeping it must be of his own free choice. A wisely 
sanctified believer is continuously watchful and, like the careful 
sentry, is never for a moment off guard. It must never be 
forgotten that the advocates of holiness and sanctification, given 
their volitional outlook, believe that at every moment it is "up to 
the person" to decide what to do, to choose what kind of person to 
be, what sort of nature to have.25 They may decide in different 
ways, but if they choose sanctification it is as freely done as if 
they had chosen to "dare to take it all ." 
There are other ways of avoiding the charge of antinomianism. 
Sanctification, said some people in the movement, results from the 
united actions of the human agent and the indwelling Spirit. To be 
sure, man is weak, but not wholly hopeless. Sanctification, rather, 
can be conceived as a cooperative effort between the human and 
Holiness Thought and the Moro/ Image of Man 51 
divine being: one tries one's best, and the other brings out the best 
that is possible--and the best that is possible with the Spirit's aid is 
perfect love and total commitment to God's commandments. 
However, other people in the movement, holding even less 
flattering views of humanity, tried to avoid antinomianism in still 
another way. Some people in the movement had not rejected the 
whole of Calvinism but believed that man is not simply weak but is 
utterly depraved. Anything a human being did in conjunction with 
the Spirit is bound to fail since corruption of any kind entails 
falling to sin, not victory over it. The kind of cooperation needed 
is a more humble one. A baptism of the Holy Ghost occurs only if 
a person chooses to seek it, decides to ask for its bestowal as a free 
gift from the grace of God. This much impact man has in the 
transaction, but not a whit more. According to one commentator, 
"It is our part, as the revealed condition of receiving the blessings 
provided for us, to 'inquire of God to do it for us' .... By the free 
assent, and consent, the full choice of our heart of hearts, Christ 
thus dwells in our hearts." 26 
There is still a problem on this view in spite of the emphasis on 
the free and uncoerced supplication to the Spirit. Even if the 
Spirit enters the heart of a person by devout invitation and 
supplication, the agency of the person subsequently seems to be 
supplanted by the agency of the Spirit. The holiness advocates 
rejected this consequence and in order to avoid it had to introduce 
a further role for human agency. The agent can always succumb to 
previous sinful ways and thus lose the Spirit's guidance in !if e. 
Our first parents and the fallen angels were once completely pure, 
or sanctified, and still they were tempted and fell. "So, when we 
have attained to a similar state, we are subject to the same 
liabilities, and, without watchfulness and prayer on our part, 'as 
the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, so our minds will be 
corrupted from the simplicity (perfect purity) that is in Christ.' " 27 
The moral image of man that emerges from the theological 
commitments of the Holiness Movement is something less flattering 
than that derived from their philosophical views. Man is weak and 
feeble and unable to conquer sin, sustain himself in troubled times, 
do the work of God effectively in parish work or revivals, and so 
on. According to some members of the tradition, man is not only 
feeble and weak but utterly depraved. He needs the active support 
of the Spirit to overcome sin , sustain heavy burdens and to advance 
God's work beyond his natural abilities. We no longer hear that an 
agent acts spontaneously, makes things happen, makes a difference 
in how the future will turn out. There is no longer a ref ere nee to 
nativistic moral input but many references to increased moral 
knowledge through the Holy Spirit. Is there an incompatibility 
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between the philosophical views on freedom and moral knowledge 
and the theological views on the same topics held by the advocates 
of the holiness tradition? I do not see that the views are strictly 
incompatible but certainly I see a different emphasis, indeed a 
strain, between the two contexts. Nevertheless, freedom remains 
absolutely essential to the Holiness Movement in order to avoid 
antinomianism. Yes, freedom is still basic but not in its 
philosophically dramatic form where one initiates actions and helps 
bring to pass one of several potential futures. Finally, the sources 
of moral knowledge in the philosophical and theological contexts 
are quite different; however they need not be incompatible . But 
has anyone shown what their relation is? No one with whom I am 
acquainted has successfully explained the relationship. 
IV 
Mahan, Finney, Upham, W. E . Boardman, Luther Lee, Lucy 
Stone, John G. Fee, John Copeland and Sallie Cowles, among 
numerous others, were moral stalwarts in the holiness tradition in 
America. They rarely seemed guilty of a rationalization to avoid 
doing their duty. Are the current members of the holiness 
tradition, and those who are not within it but have great respect 
for it, as steadfast? Or are they more prone to rationalize away 
improper behavior? Consider a student at a Wesleyan seminary 
who appropriates a book from the library on the grounds that he is 
graduating and will need it much more than anyone else and will 
use it more effectively than anyone else in his writings, dedicated, 
as they are, to advancing God's work. There is much 
rationalization here to avoid calling the act what it really is: 
stealing. 
Some of the older stalwarts in the tradition were radical in a 
sense which seems to be missing in the tradition currently. For a 
number of them evil and sin had to be rectified no matter how 
painful the consequences may have been. There were numerous 
adamant abolitionists and most others in the tradition were at least 
anti-slavery.28 Have conditions changed or have people in the 
tradition changed? I remember distinctly the deeply moving chapel 
talk of Dr. William Abernathy in which he sensitively traced his 
journey out of darkness into light, from an early racism to a 
commitment in his maturity to the welfare of blacks. It remains 
within the contemporary tradition the best rejection of segregation 
and espousal of equal opportunity that I know. And we must keep 
firmly in mind that Dr. Abernathy meant equal opportunity, not 
reverse discrimination. Have we heeded what this fine gentleman 
had to say? How many black people are there on the faculties of 
holiness colleges around the country? 
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We must not lose perspective. There are many stalwarts in the 
tradition today. And not everyone in the early days of the 
movement was saint-like. Robert Pearsall Smith's behavior was a 
severe blow to the tradition. His moral behavior was shabby, to 
say the least, and was the cause of a number of dropouts from the 
movement. However, this is an isolated case, and the question still 
remains, do we measure up to the founders? 
Mahan died in poverty, though he managed to edit Divine Life 
until his death. Are there many of us willing, like him, to emulate 
poor Jesus for the sake of helping others? 
Have any in the tradition tried recently to alleviate the tension--
though not contradiction--between their philosophical views on 
agency and their theological views on combatting sin? Or what are 
the contemporary views? 
All of these questions are difficult to answer, but they may be 
summed up in a final question: would Jesus of Nazareth be 
saddened by man's use of his gracious gift of freedom? 
Particularly now?30 Though the answers are difficult and not 
obvious, it seems the duty of anyone in the tradition, or deeply 
sympathetic with it, to raise these questions in a spirit of loving 
care. Finally, I should like to express my admiration and respect 
for the stalwarts in the tradition today. They carry on the best 
f ea tu res of the tradition and are clearly and beautifully filled with 
the presence of the Holy Spirit. I cannot work these matters into 
my own metaphysics, but neither can I deny what is evident. 
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